pect of war caught the world's attention. Basing my analysis on key ideological texts, I will try to answer the following four subquestions: How important is Iraq to the socalled global jihadists? How united are the global jihadists in their view on the struggle for Iraq? How have the war and the occupation influenced their analysis of the overall confrontation with the US and the West? And how has their view of the enemy changed after the multinational invasion of Iraq? It must be emphasized that our focus will be on the militant and internationally-orientated Islamists, which means that moderate Islamist actors and nationalist Iraqi groups will not be considered here.
The research literature contains relatively few in-depth studies of post-September 11, 2001 ideological developments in radical Islamism. 3 This study is therefore almost entirely based on primary sources, mainly Arabic texts from radical Islamist Internet sites. These sources are often problematic and cannot provide the full answer to our research question, but they represent one of our only windows into the world of militant Islamism.
The key argument in this article is that the Iraq War gave the global jihadists a welcome focal point in their struggle against the USA, but that Iraq at the same time became so attractive as a battle front that it weakened terrorist campaigns elsewhere. Moreover, it is argued that the Iraq conflict contributed to the development of more sophisticated strategic thought in jihadist circles, and to an increase in hostility toward Europe and the Gulf countries. The main objective of this analysis is to draw a more accurate picture of the global jihadist movement and to illustrate how armed conflict can generate unexpected ideological changes within radical political movements.
AL-QA'IDA AND GLOBAL JIHADISM SINCE 9/11
First of all, it is essential to define the notion of "global jihadism" and clarify its relation to other Islamist movements. "Islamism" -in itself a debated and polysemic term -is understood by this author as meaning "Islamic activism." It includes nonviolent and violent, progressive as well as reactionary, political movements. Militant groups represent only a marginal part of the Islamist political landscape. Islamist militants relate to Islamism much in the same way that left-wing extremists and Marxist guerrilla groups relate to socialism.
Militant Islamism has its own intellectual history, in which so-called "global jihadism" represents a relatively recent phenomenon. The first modern violent Islamist groups appeared in the Middle East in the 1960s and 1970s as radical expressions of broader socio-revolutionary movements. These groups struggled for state power and their main enemies were the local political regimes. In the 1980s and 1990s, Islamism as an ideological framework was adopted by nationalist and separatist movements in many different parts of the world. This type of militant Islamist group, present in places such as Palestine and Chechnya, did not fight primarily for state power, but for a specific territory. Their principal enemies were non-Muslim states or communities that contested the same piece of land. In the mid-1990s, a third type of militant Islamism appeared, namely global jihadism. It emerged as a result of Usama bin Ladin's adoption of a doctrine in 1996 which emphasized the fight against the US over the fight against local regimes. 4 The global jihad doctrine involved a reversal of the priorities of the socio-revolutionaries and the nationalist-separatists. Global jihadist ideologues said that before an Islamic state could be established in Egypt, and before Palestine could be liberated, Muslims needed to defend the entire Islamic world against the imminent military threat posed by the US and the West.
5 Bin Ladin's brothers-inarms, most of whom were veterans of the Afghan War in the 1980s, began launching terrorist attacks directly on Western targets in different parts of the world. These new jihadists were no longer struggling for a specific territory or for state power in a particular country. They were fighting to defend all Muslim territories at the same time. Their main opponent was no longer the local regimes ("the near enemy"), but the United States ("the far enemy") and its allies. The discourse of these global jihadists tended to highlight Muslims' suffering at the hands of the so-called Jewish-Crusader alliance. Their texts were characterized by long enumerations of places and events which demonstrated that Muslims were victims of oppression, occupation, and war. 6 Global jihadism found its primary operational expression in the international terrorist activity of al-Qa'ida and the so-called Afghan Arabs from the mid-1990s onwards. The term "al-Qa'ida" is very problematic and is probably most relevant to describe the organization which took shape around Usama bin Ladin in Afghanistan between 1996 and 2001. 7 Al-Qa'ida became a unique phenomenon in the history of 7. There has been a certain amount of debate over when, and if at all, al-Qa'ida ever constituted a coherent, self-aware organization. According to one version of history, al-Qa'ida was founded as an Continued on next page terrorism, because it enjoyed access to a territory, which it used to apply a unique organizational concept, namely an educational institution for global terrorism and guerrilla warfare. The organization itself remained relatively small (300-500 people), but the training camps were frequented by many more (10,000-20,000 people). 8 Radicalized Muslim youth from all over the world could travel to Afghanistan and spend time in these camps. Here lies the key to understanding the extremism and the internal cohesion of the so-called "al-Qa'ida network." The training camps generated an ultra-masculine culture of violence which brutalized the volunteers and broke down their barriers to the use of violence. Recruits increased their paramilitary skills while the harsh camp life built strong personal relationships between them. Last but not least, they fell under the ideological influence of Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri, who generated a feeling among the recruits of being part of a global vanguard of holy warriors, whose mission was to defend the Islamic world against attacks by the Jewish-Crusader alliance.
The US-led invasion of Afghanistan in the aftermath of 9/11 denied al-Qa'ida access to its territory, thus removing the basis for its unique organizational concept. Moreover, the top leadership was forced into hiding, presumably in the border area between Afghanistan and Pakistan, while the mid-level leadership and the lower ranks sought refuge in various countries around the world. Post-9/11 security measures restricted their mobility, reduced the number of available meeting-places, and made long-distance communication more difficult. The result was a weakening of what had been the organizational "glue" in the al-Qa'ida network, namely the strong personal relationships and the ideological unity. In 2002, the various local branches of the alQa'ida network were strategically disoriented, and it seemed that old ideological debates and dividing lines started reappearing. Not everyone agreed that the liberation of Afghanistan was the most important issue. What about Palestine? And what about the struggle against the local regimes in the Arab world?
One might therefore say that the invasion of Afghanistan destroyed al-Qa'ida as an organization in the analytically useful sense of the word. Instead an extremely diverse and loosely knit ideological movement emerged, which many continue to call al-Qa'ida, for lack of a better term. However, the current author prefers the term "global jihadist movement," because it better reflects the decentralized and multipolar nature of the phenomenon. This heterogeneous movement consists of actors with partially diverging political and strategic priorities. They are bound together by little more than an extreme anti-Americanism and a willingness to carry out mass-casualty
Continued from previous page organization in the late 1980s, as an offshoot of the Services Bureau and the brainchild of 'Abdallah 'Azzam (see 9/11 Commission Report; Rohan Gunaratna, Inside al-Qaida (London: Hurst, 2002)). Critics, (see Jason Burke, Al-Qaeda (London: IB Tauris, 2003)) have rightly pointed out that there are extremely few indications pre-9/11 that the name "al-Qa'ida" was ever in use by the people whom we assume to be its members. What is clear, however, is that the organizational structures around Bin Ladin became markedly more extensive, complex, and hierarchical after his move to Afghanistan in 1996. There is no doubt that by 1998-99, Bin Ladin presided over a sophisticated organization, whether the name al-Qa'ida was used internally or not.
8. The 9/11 Commission Report, p. 67.
attacks on Western targets. In more concrete terms, the old al-Qa'ida network seems to have split up into five regionally-defined clusters, whose centers of gravity are in Iraq, Saudi-Arabia, Afghanistan/Pakistan, Southeast Asia, and Europe/North Africa.
9
These networks seem to operate relatively independently from each other, although transregional contacts are widespread. In some areas, such as Iraq and Saudi Arabia, the global jihadists have formed identifiable organizations ("al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Rivers" and "al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula"). In other places, such as Europe, the organizational structures are much more difficult to identify. Two things make the global jihadists "more global" than other militant Islamists. First of all, they view the US and the West as the primary and immediate enemy, and they see their own military activity as part of a global confrontation with the Jewish-Crusader alliance. Second, their operational pattern is transnational, either in the sense that they prefer to strike at international targets in their local battle zone, or that they are willing to carry out terrorist attacks far outside of their territorial base, for example in Europe or in the US. In practice, however, the distinction between global and local jihadists is often difficult to make. For a start, all militant Islamist groups today, whether they are globally or locally oriented, use virulently anti-American rhetoric. Moreover, attacks on Western targets in places such as Iraq may also be carried out by groups with a primarily nationalist agenda. This illustrates more than anything else that the study of ideology is not an exact science and that our current concepts do not adequately capture the complex phenomenon of Islamist militancy.
These developments raise important questions. How do we identify the key ideological tendencies in a group of actors as complex and decentralized as the global jihadist movement? And how do we deal with the vast amounts of ideological material of different origin that is circulating on the Internet? A first possible step is to identify the main participants in the ideological debates. This author argues that there are five principal categories of actors that shape contemporary global jihadist ideology. The first category is represented by the leadership of the "old al-Qa'ida," i.e. Usama bin Ladin and Ayman al-Zawahiri. They have an almost mythical status in Islamist circles and still exert tremendous ideological influence. The two leaders communicate primarily through sound and video recordings diffused on Arabic television stations such as al-Jazeera and on the Internet. The statements by Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri are often quite general in content, and their main purpose seems to be to convince and motivate believers to take up arms against the enemy. Their approximately 40 statements since the autumn of 2001 have focused on the political reasons to fight the Crusaders.
10 They rarely provide specific strategic or tactical advice, and hence their declarations are always subject to interpretation by other writers. The second category consists of the religious scholars. They are most often, though not always, older people with a formal religious education. The role of these "jihad shaykhs" is to issue fatwas clarifying what is religiously legitimate or necessary to do in the struggle against the infidels.
12 They are seldom directly connected to militant groups. Most of them have been based in Saudi Arabia, Britain, or in unknown locations. Since September 11, the vast majority of these scholars have been imprisoned, put in house arrest or otherwise silenced, but some are still active. 13 Their fatwas and books are published and distributed on the Internet by young and computer-savvy assistants drawn from the entourage of students that often surround these scholars.
The third category comprises the strategic thinkers. They tend to be in their twenties or thirties and are members of militant groups, but they are generally not involved in the front line of the military operations. They write articles and books about the best way -from a functional point of view -to fight the enemy. They are thus somewhat less concerned with theological aspects of the struggle. Their publications are also distributed on the Internet. Such strategic thinkers include Yusuf al-'Ayiri, Abu Mus'ab al-Suri, and Abu 'Umar al-Sayf.
14 Some writers are completely The fourth category of ideological actors include the active militant organizations. Groups such as "al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula" and "al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Rivers" often publish their own magazines and declarations with information about their operations and texts justifying their struggle. 16 The purpose of these publications is presumably to generate a maximum of publicity about the group's activities in order to facilitate recruitment and fundraising. These texts, which are distributed on the Internet, provide important insights into how the struggle is perceived at the battlefront.
The fifth category is represented by what one might call the "grassroot radicals," i.e., the thousands of anonymous participants on radical Islamist discussion forums on the Internet, such as al-Ansar, al-Qal'a and al-Islah [the Supporters; the Citadel; Reform].
17 Every single day, hundreds of messages and commentaries are posted on these forums, which are primarily in Arabic. Subscribers can log on using fake identities and discuss politics, comment on news, and exchange rumours related to jihad fronts around the world. They can also download all the latest recordings and declarations by militant groups and leading ideologues. It is very difficult to know where these individuals come from or what they do in real life. It may seem, however, that the majority are "Internet radicals" who are not directly involved in terrorist activity.
A NEW FOCAL POINT
The most obvious change in the global jihadist movement in recent years is that Iraq is now considered by far the most important battle arena in the fight against the Jewish-Crusader alliance. A study of the textual production of leading ideologists We are following up with great interest and extreme concern the Crusaders' preparations for war to occupy a former capital of Islam, loot Muslims' wealth, and install an agent government. since then issued statements on the necessity of fighting the crusaders in Iraq. 23 The most visible and prolific theologian on the Iraq question is undoubtedly the Kuwaiti scholar Hamid al-'Ali, who has written more than 20 fatwas on various aspects of the struggle in Iraq. 24 The independent strategic thinkers have produced a large number of publications on how the jihadists should proceed to liberate Iraq. The first long strategic analyses that appeared in the autumn of 2002 focused on the strategic intentions behind the American campaign, and on the possible types of military operations the US might launch against Iraq. 25 Later analyses sought to provide concrete strategic advice on the way forward in . 27 In October 2005, this database contained 59 titles that included the name "Iraq," ten with the name "Palestine," and eight with "Chechnya."
The
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The "grassroot radicals" also seem to have expressed gradually more and more interest in the Iraq question since 2003. Today, Iraq represents by far the most common topic of discussion on the radical Islamist Web forums. Vast quantities of videos, sound recordings, books, and declarations circulate today on these forums, and most of the material concerns the jihad in Iraq.
It is difficult to measure the evolution of the relative interest in the Iraq issue in these communities. This author made an attempt at quantifying this interest by examining the digital archive of the radical Islamist Web forum al-Qal'a. By reading all the messages posted on the 15th of selected months from October 2003 to January 2005, and by classifying them by theme, I generated a data set which can be used to make some interesting observations (see Table 1 ). There are of course significant weaknesses and problems with these data, especially given the time intervals between each count and the uncertainties regarding the identity of the participants. Nevertheless, the data seem to support the hypothesis that the relative interest in the Iraqi jihad has increased gradually since 2003 (see Figure 1) . It also seems that the focus on Iraq increased the most in the period between April-August 2004, which corresponds to the most intensive phase of the campaign of abductions of foreigners in Iraq. One may also note that the number of postings was surprisingly low in late 2003, but this may have to do with the fact that the terrorist campaign in Saudi Arabia was attracting significant attention, and that the jihadist groups inside Iraq did not yet have a fully developed media apparatus. If it is the case that Iraq has gained the status as the most important battlefront for the global jihadist movement, it is natural to ask why this is so. How do the leading ideologues describe the struggle in Iraq, and what kind of reasons do they give regarding why Muslims should join the Iraqi jihad? This article argues that there are three major recurring arguments or themes in the global jihadist discourse on Iraq.
The first reason is that Iraq constitutes the best example today of Muslim suffering at the hands of Americans. Many ideologues emphasize that the US-led invasion of Iraq confirms Washington's evil intentions in the Middle East once and for all. The American-led coalition is described as having an appetite for Muslim territory as well as Muslim blood. In April 2004, Usama bin Ladin said:
America has attacked Iraq and soon will also attack Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Sudan. You should be aware the infidels cannot bear the existence of Muslims and want to capture their resources and destroy them.
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In October 2004, he added:
[O]ppression and the intentional killing of innocent women and children is a deliberate American policy. […] This means the oppressing and embargoing to death of millions as Bush Sr. did in Iraq in the greatest mass slaughter of children mankind has ever known, and it means the throwing of millions of pounds of bombs and explosives at millions of children -also in Iraq -as Bush Jr. did.
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The war and the occupation has created new and powerful symbols of Muslim suffering. Violent battles and American war crimes have introduced names such as Falluja and Abu Ghrayb into the jihadist vocabulary. New visual symbols, such as pictures of American soldiers torturing Iraqis, have added to the images of orangeclad prisoners in Guantanamo Bay as powerful expressions of Muslims' suffering. These images are very widely used in propaganda films and declarations by militant Islamist groups.
The second major topic that permeates the writings of global jihadist ideologues is that the Iraqi jihad is a strategic crossroads in the overall struggle between Muslims and the Crusaders. Iraq's position in the heart of the Islamic world and the Arab cultural sphere makes the country an extremely important battlefield. In the jihadist literature, Iraq is presented as the final entrenchment in the defence against the US entry into the region. As Bin Ladin underlined in a statement in 
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The third major theme found in jihadist writings on Iraq is that the prospects of victory are considered higher than on any other jihad front. Prominent ideologues have cited several different reasons for this, but most point out that the enormous costs and commitments undertaken by the US in Iraq represent a significant strategic advantage for the jihadists. In September 2004, Ayman al-Zawahiri described how Iraq has become a quagmire for the United States:
As for Muslim Iraq, the mujahidin in it have turned America's plan upside down after the interim government's weakness became clear. America's defeat in Iraq […] has become a matter of time, God willing. The Americans […] are between two fires; if they continue, they will bleed until death, and if they withdraw, they will lose everything.
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Others again emphasize the fact that the US now has a large and historically unprecedented military presence in the Middle East, and that it has never been easier for the jihadists to strike directly at American targets. In December 2004, Bin Ladin summarized the strategic situation in the following passage: To the mujahidin: There is now a rare and golden opportunity to make America bleed in Iraq, both economically and in terms of human losses and morale. Don't miss out on this opportunity, lest you regret it.
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DEBATE AND DISAGREEMENT
A second and seemingly paradoxical ideological development since 2002 is that the Iraq conflict introduced new dilemmas and debates that have caused a certain amount of disagreement and division among the global jihadists. Despite the consensus on Iraq being the most important battlefront in the war between the Muslims and the Crusaders, debates emerged on two new sets of questions. The first concerned the relationship between Iraq and other jihad fronts, whereas the second regarded how the war for Iraq should be waged.
From an early stage, the jihad in Iraq was considered by global jihadists as politically legitimate and theologically uncontroversial. The Iraq battlefront was also more easily accessible for the average foreign fighter than, for example Palestine, which is enclosed by Israel, and Chechnya or Afghanistan, which are geographically and culturally peripheral to most Arabs. This new and very attractive jihad front introduced a dilemma in jihadist circles worldwide: Should we fight at home or travel to Iraq? In 2003 and 2004 one could observe debates over this question in a number of militant communities.
The debate was strongest in Saudi Arabia. There, a group known as "al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula" had launched a terrorist campaign in May 2003 with a series of large-scale attacks against Western targets in the capital, Riyadh. The campaign was controversial in the wider Islamist community because the attacks and the ensuing clashes with police involved the killing of other Muslims. 36 The group behind the campaign was also criticized for undermining the jihad in Iraq, on the basis that the events in Saudi Arabia diverted media attention away from the developments in Iraq. In December 2003, the very influential Chechnya-based Saudi shaykh Abu 'Umar al-Sayf called upon the Saudi jihadists to end their terrorist campaign and travel to Iraq instead. 37 "Al-Qa'ida on the Arabian Peninsula" responded by publishing articles in their magazine Sawt al-Jihad arguing that the jihad in Saudi Arabia was beneficial to the struggle in Iraq because it put the US under pressure on several fronts. They also maintained that it was preferable for Saudi jihadists to stay and fight in the country they know the best. 38 The debate seems to have ended, at least temporarily, There are also symptoms of such debates in Europe. The European jihadists have lost most of their prominent ideologues and do not produce their own publications, so it is more difficult to follow their ideological development. However, radical Internet forums can provide a glimpse into ongoing debates. For example, one could follow a discussion on the French-language forum al-Mourabitoune in the spring of 2004 over whether it was better to fight in Iraq or in Europe. Most participants favoured Iraq, while a minority preferred Europe. Asked whether he was ready to go to Iraq, one participant wrote: "No. Because the Jihad will come to us." 40 The many recent arrests of people involved in recruitment to Iraq also suggests that jihadists in Europe are investing considerable resources in the Iraqi front rather than terrorist operations on the European continent. 42 A similar though much more intense controversy emerged after the July 7 London bombings. While many Web forum participants applauded the attacks as a long-awaited punishment to Britain for its involvement in Iraq, the influential shaykh Abu Basir al-Tartusi issued a statement strongly condemning the attack. 43 The declaration caused disbelief and confusion among grassroot jihadists, some of whom accused Abu Basir of "selling out" in order to avoid expulsion from Brit- ain. 44 In other words, it may seem that the strong consensus on the importance of the resistance in Iraq has contributed -at least temporarily -to an undermining of other jihad fronts. It is reasonable to assume that radical forces are being diverted away from other terrorist campaigns that are considered by many as being strategically unproductive or theologically controversial. This does not mean, however, that other fronts are being abandoned. Many global jihadists still believe that it is perfectly possible to fight on several fronts simultaneously. This is not least the case in Europe, where authorities have averted a large number of terrorist attacks by militant Islamists in the past few years. 45 Moreover, the Madrid and London attacks were carried out by people who no doubt saw their operation as an extension of the Iraqi resistance.
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The second major issue which has caused a certain amount of debate and disagreement is that of how to wage the jihad in Iraq. One of the main reasons for this is the overall brutalization of the methods used by militant Islamists on the Iraqi battlefield. Some groups have adopted unusual and controversial tactics, such as kidnappings and decapitations of civilians. With a few exceptions, these methods had not previously been used by radical Sunni groups before the Iraq War. 47 What is being discussed in global jihadists quarters is not so much the legitimacy, but the efficiency of such tactics. A few radical shaykhs, such as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, have openly criticized these methods as counterproductive. 48 On radical Internet forums, some participants have expressed concern that the use of such methods might undermine support for the struggle. Some of the criticism seems to have been taken into account, because since the autumn of 2004, the bullet seems to have replaced the knife as the preferred means of execution among jihadist groups in Iraq. 49 In addition to the debates over methods, there has also been some disagreement over the question of what represents legitimate targets. All global jihadists agreed very early on that Western military targets and Iraqi security forces constitute legitimate targets and that Iraqi Sunni civilians should not be targeted. Between these extremities, however, one finds several categories of targets that have been subject to debate, notably Sunni "collaborators" (e.g., drivers and interpreters), Shi'ite civilians, and Western civilians (e.g., journalists and relief workers). The question of how to deal with fellow Muslims who in some way or other help the enemy is an old and recurring issue in the jihadist literature. In the summer of 2003, the Kuwaiti shaykh Hamid al-'Ali was asked by jihadist groups in Iraq to clarify the matter. He responded in a fatwa saying: "all who serve in the enemies' ranks as collaborators […] should be treated like the enemy," but he left it to the "fighters on the ground to" decide in each specific case. 50 The question of exactly what kind of activity constitutes collaboration has not been resolved and is a source for repeated debates. It is worth noting that Usama bin Ladin, who in the past always avoided calling explicitly for violence against other Muslims, has openly declared the new Iraqi regime and all its supporters infidels.
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Controversy also surrounds the targeting of Iraqi Shi'ites by Abu Mus'ab alZarqawi and his organization "al-Qa'ida in the Land of the Two Rivers." In the past, the global jihadist movement emphasized pan-Islamism and unity among Muslims in the face of the threat from the external enemy. Although Salafi discourse has always been virulently anti-Shi'ite, Arab Islamist militants have never in modern times targeted Shi'ites on the scale we are now witnessing in Iraq. Al-Zarqawi most likely found inspiration for this strategy during his time in Pakistan, where anti-Shi'ite violence has been common since the mid-1980s. 52 The mass-casualty attacks on Iraqi Shi'ites have drawn criticism from a number of quarters. There are indications that the leadership in the old al-Qa'ida has been sceptical to this development. 53 Some grassroot radicals have questioned the anti-Shi'ite strategy in the discussion forums. 54 However, the most notable criticism has come from the influential shaykh Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, who has openly criticised al-Zarqawis indiscriminate attacks on Shi'ites in Iraq. 55 
MORE STRATEGIC THINKING
The third important ideological change since the Iraq War is that so-called "strategic studies" have been significantly developed as a distinct genre in the jihadist literature. This genre differs from other types of texts (such as fatwas or recruitment propaganda) in that its main purpose is to identify the best possible military strategy to defeat the enemy. 56 Texts in this genre have three main characteristics: they are secular in style, academic in their approach, and objective in their assessments.
"Jihadi strategic studies" have existed as a genre and way of thinking since the war in Afghanistan in the 1980s. In jihadist publications from the 1980s we find many sober strategic analyses of the struggle between the Mujahidin and the Red Army in Afghanistan. In the 1990s, strategic studies were less common as a literary genre, but survived as an intellectual tradition, not least in al-Qa'ida's training camps. It seems that this way of writing was not systematically applied in the analysis of the struggle against the USA until late 2001. In early 2002, the al-Qa'ida-affiliated Internet site "Centre for Islamic Studies and Research" and the online magazine Majallat al-Ansar published several interesting articles in this genre. 57 It is worth noting that Majallat al-Ansar featured a regular column called "Strategic Studies," starting from its first issue in January 2002. These articles avoided religious rhetoric and had no qualms about using Western news media and academic studies as references. They quoted classical military strategists like Karl von Clausewitz and used concepts like "fourth generation warfare." 58 Since the autumn of 2002, the number of texts in this genre has increased considerably. In the same period we can also observe a qualitative improvement in the strategic analyses presented in these texts. Some of them are remarkably sophisticated. A particularly interesting development is the widening of the notion of strategy to include much more than purely military factors. The analyses written since 2002 seem to put increasingly more emphasis on the political, economic, and psychological dimensions of the confrontation with the US. 59 A good example of this development is the text known as "Jihadi Iraq -Expectations and Dangers."
60 Its central argument is that that the only thing that will make the US leave Iraq is the economic cost of occupation. The best way of increasing the economic burden on Washington is to pressure its allies to withdraw from the coalition. The study then proceeds to a series of case studies of the domestic political situation in three European countries considered key members of the coalition. The author concludes that Spain is the most vulnerable link in the alliance, because the political leadership is weak and public opinion is massively against the Spanish presence in Iraq. The intellectual processes behind this development were already underway when the prospects of war in Iraq caught the jihadists' attention in late 2002. However, it is argued here that the war and occupation in Iraq contributed significantly to promoting strategic studies as a genre in jihadist literature. One reason for this is that the strong legitimacy of the struggle in Iraq reduced the need for texts justifying the fight on theological grounds. As a result, the ideologues could spend less time on the question of "why jihad?" and more time on that of "how jihad?" Moreover, the elimination in 2002 and 2003 of nearly all established "jihad shaykhs" left the ideological field more open to strategic thinkers. A second reason is that the consensus on Iraq as the most important battlefront stimulated a collective intellectual effort to resolve the question of how to evict the Americans from Iraq. Radical ideologues and strategists from all over the world have been able, by means of the Internet, to participate in a "global brainstorming" about the best strategy for liberating Iraq. A third reason is that the Iraq conflict may be said to represent a more concrete and approachable strategic problem than the global jihadists have faced in a long time. After the Iraq War, the US found itself for the first time as a conventional occupying force in the heart of the Middle East. This gave the global jihadist movement a clearly defined military task: to force the Americans out of Iraq.
NEW ENEMIES
A fourth ideological change in the global jihadist movement since the Iraq War is that their notion of the enemy seems to have been expanded and somewhat altered. One of the most conspicuous changes in the statements from the old al-Qa'ida leadership since the invasion of Afghanistan is that the number of specific countries highlighted as enemies has increased considerably. Bin Ladin and al-Zawahiri used to speak in general terms about the "Jewish-Crusader alliance" or refer to a small group of specific countries (particularly the US and Israel, occasionally the UK and France). We shouldn't wait for the American, English, French, Jewish, Hungarian, Polish and South Korean forces to invade Egypt, the Arabian Peninsula, Yemen, and Algeria and then start the resistance after the occupier had already invaded us. We should start now. The interests of America, Britain, Australia, France, Norway, Poland, South Korea, and Japan are everywhere. All of them participated in the invasion of Afghanistan, Iraq, and Chechnya, they also facilitated Israel's existence. 63 One underlying reason for this development may be that the invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq involved broad coalitions of active and passive participant countries. Since 2003, it seems that there are particularly two categories of countries that are viewed by the global jihadists with more hostility than before. The first is America's European coalition partners and the second is Iraq's neighbours in the Gulf. After 2003, European countries seem to be described increasingly often as enemies, perhaps not only because many participated in the Iraq War, but also because they arrested and convicted large numbers of militant Islamists in recent years. Other important reasons include Europe's rejection of Bin Ladin's cease-fire proposal in April 2004, and France's ban on religious symbols in schools (known as the "hijab ban"). It should be mentioned that the global jihadists' view of Europe is not monolithic. There seems to be some disagreement, at least among the "grassroot radicals," as to whether the different countries' positions on the Iraq question should be taken into account when selecting targets for terrorist attacks. targets should be avoided on the basis that the French opposed the war. Other participants disagreed. 64 This is yet another example of the paradoxical ideological effect of the Iraq War: the overall enmity to European countries seems to have increased, but the jihadists are divided by new debates over strategy.
There is less divergence regarding the status of Gulf countries such as Kuwait, Qatar, and Bahrain. Since 2003, there has been an increase in the number of texts and declarations condemning the Gulf countries' role as a military platform for the USled campaign in Iraq. In their analyses of US military strategy in the region, jihadist strategic thinkers have emphasized Washington's partnership with the smaller Gulf states. 65 Some militant groups have called repeatedly for terrorist attacks in the smaller Gulf countries in order to liberate the entire Arabian Peninsula from Crusader occupation. 66 Postings mentioning Gulf states, which used to be a rarity on the jihadist discussion forums, seem to have become more frequent since the autumn of 2002. This interest has been further fuelled by the increase in the number of violent incidents in Gulf countries such as Kuwait and Qatar.
CONCLUSIONS
This article has argued that four major ideological changes have taken place in the global jihadist movement since the Iraq War. First, the invasion of Iraq gave the global jihadists a strategic and emotional focal point at a time when the movement was strategically disorientated, having lost its territorial base in Afghanistan. Second, the Iraq War and the occupation have introduced new dilemmas and questions that have caused debate and may have led to a channelling of radical forces to Iraq, possibly at the expense of other jihad fronts. Third, the occupation of Iraq contributed to the development and refinement of so-called "strategic studies" as a genre in jihadist literature. Finally, the Iraq experience has changed the jihadists' notion of the enemy and placed the Gulf countries and Europe more clearly in the spotlight.
Some of these changes were predictable before the war; others were not. Many analysts predicted that an attack on Iraq would constitute a propaganda coup for the global jihadists, who for years had been describing America as a warmonger with imperialist ambitions in the Middle East. Few people, however, had expected that Iraq would be so attractive as a battle front that it would weaken, at least in the shortrun, terrorist campaigns elsewhere. And nobody could know that Spain would be the country in Europe to be hit first and hardest by Iraq-inspired terrorism.
These developments add to the many historical examples of unexpected ideological consequences of war that should inspire humility in even the most confident of analysts. Who could have known that the veterans from the first Afghan War would turn so quickly against America? Who could have predicted that the deployment of US troops in Saudi Arabia during the 1990-91 Gulf crisis would be interpreted by Usama bin Ladin as an occupation of Islam's holy places? Who realized that the start of the second Chechen War in 1999 would lead to such a dramatic increase in international recruitment to al-Qa'ida's training camps in Afghanistan?
We still do not know what the full consequences of the war in Iraq will be for the future of international terrorism. So far there have been surprisingly few cases of terrorism spillover from Iraq, but such attacks may very well increase in the future. What is certain, however, is that the consequences of the war will be long-lasting. Let us not forget that the current leaders of the global jihadist movement joined the first Afghan War as young recruits more than 20 years ago.
